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Abstract  
The mandate, or terms of reference, applicable to a state-building 
mission should clearly articulate the activities and actions of the 
intervention in order to maintain progress and to provide a clear 
outline for those undertaking the programmes. Often this is not the 
case, due in part to the blurry boundaries that surround definitions 
of state and nation-building, and secondly to the growing necessity 
of limiting activities to priorities that meet the interests of the 
donors, which are inherently political in nature, require tangible 
and assessable measurements to determine success. This paper will 
demonstrate that it is often the least visible elements of a state-
building mission that matter the most when truly localising and 
contextualising the activities of state-building.  
 
This article has been peer reviewed 
Since its deployment in July 2003 the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has oscillated between 
extremes of praise and criticism. In its first year RAMSI attracted 
acclaim as it quickly quelled the violence, although by 2006 and 
2007 there was criticism over tensions with the Solomon Islands 
Government under the Prime Ministership of Manasseh Sogavare. 
In the most recent changes in 2013 there was an overhaul of 
RAMSI’s mandate, announcing a transition to a policing-only 
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mission pending RAMSI’s proposed withdrawal in 2017. RAMSI’s 
initial successes in the police-led stability mission were labelled a 
potential model for future interventions, however as Fullilove’s 
article came out just before the 2006 riots in Honiara it seems this 
period was far from well understood by at least one commentator.
1
  
With police in the frontline and the military force keeping a 
low profile, the RAMSI presence was bolstered by a large 
development assistance program. RAMSI drew international 
attention for its effectiveness in establishing authority and peace, 
however in the longer term, a shift in the boundaries of the 
intervention led to RAMSI altering from a purely security-based 
mission, to one with an agenda of capacity building and 
development. The mission has attracted criticism both for the 
methodology of its capacity-building strategy, and its approach to 
leaving issues that it has considered too ‘culturally sensitive’ to the 
Solomon Islanders to sort out, although this criticism may in fact 
say less about the scope of the mission than about the construction 
and expectations of aid delivery through state-building activities. 
RAMSI’s experience illuminates the reality that rebuilding 
objectives are often ill-defined and vague concerning the strategies 
and programmes that will pave the road forward towards 
achievable and lasting state development. This raises the question 
of whether state-building provides measureable assistance to the 
populations of affected states. Conversely, do the boundaries set by 
inherited state roles and responsibilities reflect more about the 
expectations of developed states regarding stability and security? 
The latter question is particularly pertinent in the post 9-11 security 
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situation, as stabilisation missions such as RAMSI are expected to 
achieve much more than merely to restore law and order—there are 
a raft of new responsibilities relating to development and 
sustainability of the state that are based on western definitions of 
what makes a state a ‘success’.  
One problem RAMSI faced in the implementation of its 
mandate in Solomon Islands was the impact of prioritising security 
before humanitarian issues. This led to a sentiment among local 
people that RAMSI should be doing more, and that it failed to 
adequately ‘give-back’ to the wider community in a substantive 
manner. This article will argue that RAMSI, while flawed, does 
contain some important lessons for future stability missions, 
including the necessity of localising a mandate and implementing 
adequate adaptation or adjustment of the mandate given existing 
socio-cultural circumstances so as to tailor it to international ‘best 
practice’ in state-building. This will be shown by considering the 
characterisation and construction of RAMSI’s mandate centrally by 
explaining the difficulties of drawing a line in the sand to 
determine the boundaries of state-building activities. This argument 
will centre on the linkage between Australia’s interests in 
stabilising the region, to create a security-focused intervention, and 
the related necessity of including ‘tangible’ and assessable 
programmes to demonstrate success. Through arguing RAMSI’s 
mandate was constructed based on a western contextualisation of 
conflict, and a rigid separation of ‘private’ and ‘public’, it will 
become clear that socio-cultural issues were considered both too 
difficult to manage, in terms of demonstrable success, and outside 
of the Australian-interest orientated remit of a state-building 
activity geared heavily towards a western approach to developing 
stability in processes of governance.      
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Background to the RAMSI deployment 
The RAMSI deployment in July 2003 signalled a dramatic 
shift in Australian foreign policy. RAMSI was established under 
the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum’s Biketawa Declaration 
of 2000. RAMSI combined a military presence operating alongside, 
rather than in front of, a strong police-led authority structure for 
reinstituting peace. RAMSI entered Solomon Islands with 2200 
combined police and military force, 1700 of which were 
Australian, with 17 personnel designated for the Economic 
Governance pillar arriving in August 2003.
2
 Additionally, when 
viewed on a comparative basis, RAMSI’s use of in-line personnel 
sits in diametric opposition to traditional development models 
wherein advisors oversee completion of tasks, rather than overtake 
the stated job description of the local colleague. RAMSI’s 
formation represented a ‘backflip’ in Australia’s hands-off 
approach to the problems of our closest neighbours in the Pacific 
region. Further its existence is a vivid example of the demonstrated 
importance placed on strong governance to secure and stabilise the 
region in the post 9-11 political period.   
The rationale behind this shift involves, amongst other 
factors, the strategic importance of the military relationship 
between the United States and Australia. As part of ensuring the 
continued health of the US alliance, Australia insisted it would 
assist to the best of its ability in the War on Terror. Part of this 
involved Australia demonstrating it could look after ‘our patch’, the 
South Pacific. In an interview in November 2013 former Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated ‘there is no one else to 
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do it, these days the Americans aren’t going to get involved in the 
South-Pacific, New Zealand isn’t able to do it on their own…. Do it 
ourselves or leave the place a smoking ruins’.3 Further, there was a 
concern that if Solomon Islands had been left alone, there would 
have been the possibility of a ‘contagion effect’ and wider state 
collapse through an expansion of conflict into an only recently 
peaceful Bougainville, and more importantly, into Papua New 
Guinea.
4
  
The RAMSI intervention did not occur during the worst of 
the violence in Solomon Islands—that was in 1999/2000 and was 
‘settled’ by the October 2000 Peace Agreement signed in 
Townsville. RAMSI was entering after the height of the conflict, 
which was a curious position for an intervention mandated 
specifically at security and law and order. This is not to deny that 
there was violence occurring, and the situation was of concern, but 
the answer as to why this intervention entered at this point has been 
heavily debated. In early 2003 Australia had refused the same 
requests to intervene and Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
only said yes to Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Allen 
Kemakeza’s plea for assistance in April 2003. Australia’s 
involvement in the Iraq conflict was limited, but deeply unpopular, 
so it is possible that the RAMSI mission provided a face-lift in 
public relations for Australian Foreign Policy. It is significant to 
note that both operations in Iraq and Solomon Islands were led by 
influential states, in a sort of ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in each 
instance, rather than the United Nations. After all, it seemed 
‘illogical’ to argue a mission that aimed to save lives and stop 
terrorism was not inherently right. 
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While the spectre of terrorism was later dismissed even by 
its proponents, during 2003 there was concern within the Australian 
government about what Downer described as the ‘contagion 
effect’5, and it was felt there was a possibility that gains achieved 
in the long running conflict in Bougainville, could be endangered. 
This security focus coloured the construction of the RAMSI 
mission, and led to a style of intervention which did not force 
engagement with issues considered as the core causes of tension in 
the recently leaked Truth and Reconciliation Commission report,
6
 
particularly access to, and ownership of, land. This avoidance by 
RAMSI of the root causes of conflict in the construction of the 
mandate raises wider global issues of significance concerning to 
what extent security can legitimately be restored without probing 
the issues that originally ignite conflicts. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to ask if international state-building ‘best practice’, 
which requires attention to issues of development, was overlooked 
in the RAMSI example, leading to a mandate that was, possibly too 
vague. If so, this was likely due to the avoidance of the deeper-
seated socio-cultural issues, and a disregard for the fact there was 
only a very rudimentary private sector beyond the unsustainable 
logging industry.  
The development of RAMSI. 
The Australian government knew, as early as 2000, 
according to Retired General Jim Molan, that Australia may need 
to send in troops to Solomon Islands.
7
 Nic Maclellan suggests in 
addition to the arguments of ethnicity and poor governance, which 
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are typically cited as the drivers to the ‘tensions’ of Solomon 
Islands, it is important to note there were also environmental 
factors such as the 1998 El Nino drought, and the Asian economic 
crisis that led to a 20% drop in logging revenues. These factors 
were largely beyond the control of politicians.
8
 The purpose of 
RAMSI, from the beginning was to stabilise the state. Stability in 
the western ethos of development requires both economic and legal 
stabilisation, in the form of rule of law and economic growth. This 
prioritisation of stabilisation of economic and legal aspects of 
society in rebuilding Solomon Islands targets the drivers of poor 
governance and law and order. Problematically for the success of 
state-building programmes the implementation of this agenda is 
much more complicated.  
The assumptions of state-building ‘best practice’ are three-
fold; a state requires enforceable property rights, enforceable 
contractual rights and a functioning economic system.
9
 It is critical 
to note this definition is highly economistic, a clear problem with 
basic statebuilding rhetoric and underlying assumptions for the 
successful state. It also ignores the importance of Weber’s 
monopoly of the legitimate use of violence as a means to maintain 
law and order, which came to be of central importance in assisting 
Solomon Islands. So what happens in cases when these 
assumptions do not exist? What role do state-building programmes 
have in re-building and creating effective governance if there is no 
concrete foundations on which to base state institutions? The 
definitional lines on what role a state-building mission has for the 
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development of a fragile state whilst in-situ are at best blurry;
10
 as 
such it is little wonder that guidelines for the activities of state-
building mission such as RAMSI are ill-defined and vague. For 
RAMSI this played out in the lack of preparedness for the 
transition from Phase 1 (quelling violence and restoring law and 
order) to Phase 2 (capacity building) and the very late engagement 
of the programme with issues of the social or cultural sectors of 
governance, as illustrated in the quiet introduction of gender into 
the program of assistance in June 2012.  
RAMSI had some early successes with the initial stages 
completed in a speedy timeframe, appeasing both the governments 
of Australia and Solomon Islands. Two of the main self-proclaimed 
warlords, Harold Keke and Jimmy ‘Rasta’ Lusibaea, were captured 
and prosecuted in Solomon Islands legal system faster than had 
been envisaged.
11
 The shortened timeframe was perhaps due to 
Australia’s mischaracterisation of the nature of scale and root 
causes of violence. The rapid arrests exposed a flaw in RAMSI’s 
lack of preparation for the transition to the second phase of the 
mission. Following early success in Phase 1, a large contingent of 
police was sent home, and this decision proved ill advised when 
following elections in 2006 there were public demonstrations that 
turned violent, and which led to many buildings in Honiara’s 
Chinatown being razed. The later Commission of Inquiry pointed 
out the departure of the Police had left only 13 people trained in 
riot control in the ranks of the Participating Police Force, and none 
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in the Royal Solomon Islands Police.
12
 This riot was a lesson in 
itself that a large contingent of the police had been sent home too 
early, fanning a political firestorm that would ensure the immediate 
focus of RAMSI remained security. There is the argument that 
2006 was possibly a tipping point for RAMSI’s programs towards 
something more social in nature, with the People’s Surveys 
beginning in 2006 to gain more of an understanding of the views of 
citizens.
13
 These surveys were designed to gain feedback, however 
as mentioned in the surveys should be ‘always used with care and 
qualification’14 as they are not based on a representative sample. 
The feedback of the results of these surveys back into RAMSI 
policy is questionable, as significant policy progress on areas 
outside of institutional strengthening remained slow until much 
later in RAMSI’s tenure. 
RAMSI went into Solomon Islands with a strategy centred 
on law and order, particularly restoring the rule of law. This was 
completed through improving law and order and quietening 
violence. Not until as much as eighteen months later did the focus 
shift to building capability through in-line positions in key 
institutions, coupled with local training programs for Solomon 
Islanders to learn from RAMSI personnel. Alexander Downer 
acknowledged Solomon Islands did not originally seek the capacity 
building portion of the mission, however the Australian 
government, after reluctantly agreeing to intervene, believed this 
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was essential to ‘fixing’ the state.15 This belief that a core problem 
of Solomon Islands was the ineffective political system issue was 
diagnosed during a National Security Assessment Committee 
meeting in early 2003. The ramifications of this decision continue 
to be felt in Solomon Islands, where the capacity building phase 
has from October 2013 fully transitioned to a bilateral aid program, 
although arguably there is still much to be done to establish an 
effective self-sustaining governance structure. 
RAMSI’s mandate —its terms of reference for the 
mission—were devised mostly within Australia, and generally 
without input from other PIF states, apart from a general 
concern from some Melanesian states vis-à-vis the importance 
of sovereignty for Solomon Islands. The legal mandate of the 
mission stated RAMSI would enter Solomon Islands, but the 
Australian government required a legislative provision that 
demonstrated the consent of Solomon Islands to the mission. 
This stipulation would later cause concern for the Australian 
government when Manesseh Sogavare’s policies clashed with 
RAMSI’s, hence Sogavare sought to dismiss RAMSI and 
dismantle the governance-strengthening arm of the mission.  
The lack of clarity and strategic direction of mandate drives 
the direction of state-building and provides the basis on which 
reactions are formed to the activities of an intervention. The lack of 
precise guidelines in RAMSI’s mandate led to misunderstandings 
and debate concerning the applicable role for the mission, causing 
‘rocky patches’ in international relations between the largest donor, 
Australia and the Solomon Islands government. Following the 
elections and subsequent riots of April 2006, Sogavare was elected 
                                                 
15
 Alexander Downer, personal interview completed with writer on 27
th
 
November 2013. 
Fault in the mandate and flaws in state-building logic – Kylie Evans 
68 
as the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands. His appointment began a 
series of diplomatic conflicts between Australia and Solomon 
Islands, including attempts at extraditing and prosecuting 
Sogovare’s choice of Attorney General, Julian Moti. In stating this, 
Sogavare also appointed John Roughan to promote a more village-
centred form of development using existing land tenure laws that 
planned to focus more on rural development creating tension with 
the plans of RAMSI’s Machinery of Governance programs centred 
on Honiara.
16
 Sogavare and his ministers led from a position of 
influence and attempted to reduce the popularity of RAMSI among 
locals in Solomon Islands, however this was countered with an 
open letter by Alexander Downer that sought to undermine calls for 
the dismissal of RAMSI. Downer’s letter alerted citizens of 
Solomon Islands to the potential consequences of dismissing 
RAMSI. Downer has stated himself this letter was quite a good 
diplomatic move and a later trip to Solomon Islands cemented the 
tenure of RAMSI for another six years.
17
 Downer argues this letter 
and visit to Solomon Islands in 2007 smoothed the waters with 
Solomon Islands. The letter itself could be argued to have infringed 
too heavily on the sovereignty and role of the Solomon Islands 
national government through by-passing the National Government 
and speaking directly to the citizens of Solomon Islands. The anti-
RAMSI sentiments harboured by Sogavare, and heightened 
tensions with Solomon Islands Government during his period in 
office, were also a cause for concern for the then Special 
Coordinator, and head of the RAMSI Mission, Tim George 
(November 2006 – December 2008). George moved to calm 
relations through, amongst other things, travelling with PM 
Sogavare on an extended trip throughout distant provinces to 
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inspect the damage of the tsunami in Western Province in April 
2007. During this trip George states he learnt a great deal about 
Sogavare’s position and his concerns, and that this facilitated a 
more understanding relationship with the PM in the future.
18
 The 
removal of Sogavare during a no-confidence vote in December 
2007 and his subsequent replacement with popularly elected Dr 
Derek Sikua, heralded an end to the tensions and uneasy relations 
between SIG and RAMSI. The improved relationship continued 
following the election of Gordon Darcy Lilo to the office of Prime 
Minister in November 2011. The question remains though whether 
altering the provisions of the mandate or legal documentation to 
include regular amendments or, even a tentative end date may have 
lessened these rocky patches in the relationship between the 
Special Coordinator, the Australian Government and the Solomon 
Islands government. Or, alternately whether such a provision may 
have caused a higher level of political anxieties with a looming 
finish date for RAMSI. Interestingly in the aftermath of these 
events the mandate was provided a more precise matrix, in the form 
of the Partnership Agreement, upon which the direction and 
assessment of RAMSI’s current and future activities could be 
based.  
The application of mandate in Solomon Islands. 
The tensions between Australia and Solomon Islands over 
RAMSI highlights two separate issues: firstly, there is criticism that 
the largely Australian funded, and staffed, regional intervention 
was somewhat neo-colonial; secondly, that Australia had enacted a 
sort of parallel government through the RAMSI Intervention. 
Criticism of the neo-colonial nature of RAMSI can, to a certain 
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extent, be countered with the argument that the measures and 
policies of RAMSI remain essential for building stability and 
sustainability for the country by establishing an effective and self-
sustaining political system. However, the sheer scale of RAMSI 
does draw parallels between it and previous colonial 
administrations.  
RAMSI has undertaken work across three pillars of 
Solomon Islands government including; law and justice, economic 
governance and growth and machinery of government. RAMSI had 
clear priorities on entering Solomon Islands; firstly to bring the 
state back in line with the rule of law through quelling violence; 
secondly to install in-line personnel in key positions in government 
to build capability and trust in government institutions. Amongst 
the targeted areas of were; the Judicial system, key ministries 
including Finance, Treasury and Immigration. During the 2011-12 
financial year Australia spent $43.5 million on RAMSI,
19
 with the 
overall cost estimated for the mission estimated by the Lowy 
Institute at $2.6 billion
20
 (AUD). All for a small island-state, that 
quite possibly a large majority of Australians could not find on a 
map, with a population of 500 000. At no other time in Solomon 
Islands’ short history as a state have so many resources been 
dedicated to building its state infrastructure. During the colonial 
period there was a severe under-resourcing of the Protectorate.
21
 
Despite this increased spending, one of the key criticisms of the 
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colonial intervention in Solomon Islands is the under-funding and 
lack of state saturation into the provincial areas of Solomon 
Islands.
22
 Though some have commented that RAMSI represents a 
waste of Australian tax-payer money, there has indeed been some 
debate as to the mechanisms and methodology used in RAMSI to 
assist Solomon Islands. One of which is the expensive ‘in-line’ 
method used to build the capability of state institutions, with 
questions of whether such a transfer of knowledge is possible 
between such different states.
23
 The discussion surrounding the 
methods used for the Machinery of Government arm of RAMSI 
does not tend to centre on the cost, rather the methods. Squabbles 
concerning costs, as raised by Hayward-Jones, and whether one 
approach may cost less than another, miss the entire point of 
‘assisting’ a neighbour in trouble. The issue at hand should not be 
solely cost-driven (although economic factors will no doubt remain 
important for the foreseeable future due to budgetary concerns) 
rather issues of success might better be based on implementing 
systems that will facilitate a locally driven movement towards 
development. Determining how to form and complete such a 
mission remains one of the most important factors in operations 
such as RAMSI.  
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Statebuilding and re-building – where to draw the line? 
RAMSI has undertaken work across a wide scope in 
Solomon Islands, although criticism remains concerning the areas 
left out of the mission. With an estimated $2.6 billion spent on 
RAMSI, the question must be asked where do Australia’s interests 
and the role of a state-building mission end? State-building 
programmes have long been understood to not be ‘nation-
builders’24 and have attempted to remain separate from issues of 
cultural sensitivity which require more in-depth localised 
knowledge of social structures. However, this mentality seems to 
divorce the governance of the state from the society that it 
governs.
25
 Rearing the head of a longstanding conundrum for 
architects of state-building programmes, where is the line drawn 
and what issues must be left-out? The constructors of RAMSI’s 
mandate drew this line in the sand between issues that involve 
‘intangible’ elements, those that cannot be measured or tracked by 
econometric indicators, and institutional reforms that are able to be 
given precise data-driven assessment.   
An area of RAMSI that deals both with the demographic 
spread of the population and institutional reform which has 
received much less positive recognition is its work completed with 
the provincial governments. Some 80% of the population lives in 
the provinces of Solomon Islands, outside of the capital Honiara.
26
 
Like the national state, the provincial government system of 
Solomon Islands also has a long history with allegations of 
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corruption. The Provincial Government Strengthening Program 
(PGSP) is implemented by the UN Development Program, however 
it is funded and brought into existence by RAMSI. This program 
seeks to ensure adequate funding and delivery of basic services and 
development assistance into the provinces of the state. The PGSP 
rationale, as provided by the UNDF, states the rationale for this 
project is ‘strengthening governance capacity for improved service 
delivery at the provincial level.’27 Through promoting capacity in 
the provincial authorities the donors are then able to leverage 
funding ‘by incentivising provincial authorities to adopt 
participatory and transparent expenditure management practices.’28 
The project has not been without issue, and it has been under 
pressure due both to the fluidity of staff-turnover in the senior 
echelons of Solomon Islands public service, and because of the 
clash between public and private responsibilities for both elected 
officials and bureaucrats.  Provincial governments have been 
poorly managed in the past,
29
 and the PGSP aims to overcome this 
challenge through improving service delivery and financial 
management of their budgetary requirements. An analysis of 
relevant documents points out a difference in approach between 
RAMSI and the UNDP—for instance the UNDP documentation 
regarding PGSP, places emphasis on improved service delivery, 
whereas in RAMSI the aim is ‘more responsive service delivery 
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and improved local development in provinces.’30Clearly the two 
definitions are closely linked, however the UNDP’s places a more 
realistic emphasis on simply delivering services, rather than the 
added complexity of more responsive delivery, understood as a step 
up, and as advocated by RAMSI. The approach favoured by 
RAMSI links more closely to the ideals dominant in a ‘good 
governance’ agenda, rather than a more concrete basis in the 
everyday lives of Solomon Islanders in the provinces.  
The complexities of cross-donor relations are not new to 
this program, or indeed Solomon Islands, but the problem does 
present a clear issue for the future of coordinated development 
assistance in Solomon Islands during the current phase following 
the transferral of development assistance to AusAID, and since 
September 2013 to the Australian High Commission. Additionally, 
the continuation of discourses the stress ‘responsive-ness’ and 
‘improve-ment’ signals the extension of a mentality of data-driven 
economic assessment of the successes of RAMSI and the 
weaknesses, rather than strengths, of Solomon Islands governance. 
Highlighting a wider trend towards drawing a line in the sand 
between institutional reforms and interactions with issues of the 
social sector, which through closer discussion with civil society 
may facilitate a more localised approach to developing capacity.    
Where to now for RAMSI? 
RAMSI is currently in its post-transition phase, with a 
policing-only mission effective as of June 2013.
31
 RAMSI has now 
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transitioned, not finished, its capacity development role in Solomon 
Islands government, and has moved away from the RAMSI model 
of in-line positions towards a more traditional development model 
of advisors in government ministries. As the argument goes, 
RAMSI is no longer needed in this area and the work can be 
supervised by an aid agency as the Solomon Islands state is now 
within the boundaries of assistance facilitated through traditional 
aid models. Unquestionably this should not lead to the conclusion 
the state is out of the metaphorical woods, rather is now at the stage 
of a ‘normal’ developing state. RAMSI is now a policing-only 
mission and will remain in Solomon Islands for the next four years. 
The newest Special Coordinator Justine Braithwaite expanded upon 
the current priorities of RAMSI recently by stating ‘what we are 
trying to do through the drawdown strategy and our capacity 
development plan is put in place workable solutions for the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police Force that they will be able to maintain and 
manage after RAMSI leaves.’32Further, there will also be an 
increased focus upon the entrenched family and gender-based 
violence (GBV) against women. It would seem RAMSI has left 
engagement with issues of the social sector of governance until 
last. This issue has a considerable history in the country.  Along 
with logging and land tenure, GBV was an issue which, until the 
past 18 months, RAMSI had regarded as being too culturally 
sensitive. In this instance it sees quite possible there are two 
separate definitions of security used to assess the successes of 
RAMSI. The mandate of RAMSI is based on state security, with 
the core concern being the safety of the region and the continued 
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viability of the Solomon Islands state. Warding against the 
disintegration of state boundaries and significantly, avoiding 
potential ‘petri-dishes’ for terrorism that Wainwright warned of in 
the ASPI report of 2003.
33
 There is another definition of security, 
human security, which concerns itself less crucially with the state 
and more with the humans living within the state.
34
As Axworthy 
states ‘human security today puts people first and recognizes that 
their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of 
international peace and security. The security of states is essential, 
but not sufficient.’35Utilising this definition of security the 
concerns of GBV and the social sector are of vital importance to 
developing the security of the citizens, and state, of Solomon 
Islands. 
The issues of land and logging are areas wherein RAMSI 
has stated it would not interfere with current provisions beyond the 
assisting with administrative-based assistance. However, the close 
relationship that exists between GBV and law and order issues, 
which have been firmly inside the boundaries of RAMSI’s 
mandate, makes the problem of violence against women much 
more difficult to ignore. The rationale behind culturally sensitive 
issues being either left until last or avoided by RAMSI lies, 
critically, in the formation and construction of its mandate. The 
mandate of RAMSI sought to assist in areas understood to have 
contributed to degeneration of state security and governance, 
linking back to the wider Australian imperative of maintaining 
regional security.  
                                                 
33
 Elsina Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour Australia and the future of 
Solomon Islands, ASPI, 2003, Sydney. 
34
 See Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting 
People First”, Global Insights, Global Governance, 7(2001), p. 19-23. 
35
 Ibid, p. 19. 
FJHP – Volume 30 – 2014 
77 
The approach adopted by creators of RAMSI privileged 
a foreign security-driven perspective, avoiding issues more 
closely linked to broader ideals of human rights that tend to be 
reflected by traditional aid programs. RAMSI’s construction 
drew on a security framework, seeking to isolate the state as 
weakened, and therefore in need of governance and law and 
order reform. This initial diagnosis or characterisation led to a 
program that looked quite deeply into the surface areas of 
concern, but shied away from looking at deeper issues that were 
potentially more related to the historical and cultural 
development of the state during the stages of colonisation and 
de-colonisation.
36
 By firmly establishing a framework that 
prioritised the machinery of the state—specifically areas of 
government bureaucracy—rather than a more targeted response 
to community issues, RAMSI has prioritised the development of 
a more urbanised state with more resources centralised in 
Honiara. This concentration is problematic as many Solomon 
Islanders continue to live outside of Honiara and provincial 
capitals, potentially feeding into long-standing resentments of 
inequitable resource distribution.
37
  
The purpose of RAMSI was to provide stability for the 
region and state-wide governance reform. The assumption in 
this context is thoroughly western, and the framework is based 
on the good governance agenda and western ideals of state 
development, which themselves evolved only slowly in the West 
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and with many hurdles. In the western or developed state 
context, state development assumes a certain prioritisation of 
society and a clear relationship between public life and private 
life, which itself draws on a division and segregation of the two 
opposing roles. Without this separation, there is no transparency 
or accountability for the ideals of good, responsible or effective 
governance to be built. RAMSI’s approach is built upon the 
‘good governance’ agenda centralising transparency, 
accountability and natural justice. Hence, there is a base 
contradiction in mandate.  
In Solomon Islands, and to a certain extent the wider 
Pacific region, this separation of public and private is much less 
certain, and so the social boundaries which inform decision-
making remain closely linked to kastom. This term that can, in 
rather simplistic terms, be explained as a historical system of 
community ties that bond and simultaneously separate the 
people of the state from one another.
38
 The characterisation of 
RAMSI as a program seeking to build capacity and ensure long-
term stability relies upon achievements in its mandate, and is 
required to ensure a consistent direction for the intervention. The 
strategy provided by RAMSI’s mandate demonstrates a 
minimalist approach to inclusion of the complex web of social 
interactions that exists inside the state. The division of the 
political from the social, which seems to have been the intent, 
promotes a detached western approach to aid and development 
assistance. Although many of the programs have been 
implemented with greater consultation and in-line personnel are 
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briefed regarding the causes of the conflict and cultural history 
of the state, the key issue for Solomon Islands’ long term 
stability lies in the relationship between the modes of 
development and traditional structures of authority and kinship.  
The interwoven nature of kastom and wantokism
39
 sit in 
opposition to the liberal development model that prioritises the 
clear separation of culture and state. Kastom should not be viewed 
as something that will be outgrown, rather as a way of viewing the 
world which is rooted in the practices and institutions of 
government. RAMSI’s programs can consequently never be 
extracted from the social aspects of the society of Solomon Islands, 
nor value-free or neutral as is emphasised in western states as the 
goal for state success. In the lived social reality of Solomon Islands 
society this clear division is much more complex, with a social 
reality that includes many extended family obligations. 
Increasingly as rapid urbanisation continues with the movement of 
the younger generation into Honiara and provincial centres, away 
from village subsistence lifestyles, many of the previous wantok 
relationships are forming new boundaries, extending from one of 
village life to a security net in the urban setting. This evolution 
does not necessarily dissolve wantok relationships, rather it creates 
new relationships and obligations for those in higher positions of 
power to provide for their kin-group members.  
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This expectation is problematic in a number of ways for 
Honiara residents. Firstly, for those that are already living in 
settlements around Honiara the expectation of assistance adds to 
the number of people living in poorly serviced settlements beyond 
Honiara’s boundaries. Rapid urbanisation is a problem in many 
developing states in terms of the provision of basic services; for 
RAMSI this problem was not prioritized, possibly as it was 
considered not to have significantly affected the degeneration into 
lawlessness. This is a problem, as not only is land central to any 
understanding of life in Solomon Islands, but also the lack of 
services available at these settlements adds to the sentiment that 
resources are not fairly distributed and the stratification of society 
is extended.  Further, without adequate distribution of resources 
greater emphasis is placed on informal means of gaining resources, 
these obligations are translated onto Honiara’s residents that 
occupy positions of power, and they have, in the past, led to 
inappropriate uses of power and systemic corruption in government 
bureaucracy. The programs implemented by RAMSI have built up 
the power and competency of government staff and have provided 
law and order for the state. Overall they have improved the 
effective governance of the state. The assumption of the binary of 
the public and private roles of people is however flawed as the 
social boundaries and wantok system that forms the cultural and 
historical fabric of Solomon Islands society is inherently dissimilar 
to the western or Australian model. Such a transition took over a 
thousand years to develop in the West. Is it fair to require this large 
step in a single generation? Or further, to assume Solomon 
Islanders wish to relinquish their communal values and adopt a 
western individualist model? The answer must unequivocally be 
no. The result of this public-private separation is understood as 
corruption, and the social ties that tend to accentuate it in Solomon 
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Islands have not been removed with the institutional rebuilding 
facilitated by RAMSI.  
Conclusions 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands is 
premised upon the need to ensure security and stability for 
Australia’s ‘Near Abroad’, and it represents an intervention that led 
to a backflip in Australia’s foreign policy position. The first year of 
the intervention was hailed as a potential lesson for future stability 
missions, however only three years later in 2006, Solomon Islands 
experienced a large riot, allegedly linked to the continuing presence 
of corruption in government institutions and continuing problems 
regarding the role of government officials. This riot was a lesson 
for RAMSI planners that transition out of the state would need to 
be gradual. The riots fanned a political firestorm, signalling there 
were many issues that remained unresolved. The fact the 2006 riot 
occurred after the heavy initial focus on law and order would 
ensure the focus of RAMSI, for the time being, remained on 
stabilisation and security, with social issues of significance such as 
land ownership and GBV minimised. RAMSI’s attempt to 
transition out of Solomon Islands has meant a return to a more 
traditional bilateral aid relationship with Australia, handing back 
authority for in-line government positions to local counterparts, 
which have been ‘trained’ regarding the appropriate nature of their 
roles. The mission is now a police-only mission, with the added 
priorities of women’s issues such as GBV, both matters linked to 
capacity development of the RSIPF.  
The RAMSI mission (and arguably the western model of 
aid delivery) facilitates an approach that centralises governance. 
It imitates, or at least closely follows, the structure of developed 
states. The application of such a model in Solomon Islands is 
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based on flawed assumptions as the state is only one source of 
authority, not the source. Kastom continues to play a strong role 
in people’s lives through the predominance of reciprocal 
obligations in the wider-community setting. The construction 
and characterisation of RAMSI’s mandate fits with the best 
practice model of good governance through prioritising 
transparency and accountability through institutional rebuilding, 
promoting natural justice in the judiciary and beginning a 
generational shift in dealing with the problem of corruption. Yet 
it has not engaged with many of the issues considered too 
sensitive, or beyond the remit of a state-building intervention 
that are actually integral to the long-term feasibility and self-
sustainability of the systems being implemented. Through 
avoiding so-called ‘social issues’ or culturally sensitive issues, 
the mandate fails to engage with the daily practicalities of 
Solomon Islands citizens, broadening the existing gap between 
the activities and actions of the centralised state and the lives of 
its people. 
As for the lessons from RAMSI for future interventions, 
the most potent one should be to begin with a clear precise 
mandate, which recognises the interactivity of developing states 
and the difficulty of transitioning between subsistence lifestyles 
and the urban cash-based economy. By focussing too heavily on 
the necessity for transparent institutions and economic growth 
there can be a tendency to avoid basic human rights which affect 
the daily lives of the state’s citizens. 
 
 
 
FJHP – Volume 30 – 2014 
83 
 
About the Author 
Kylie Evans is currently in the final stages of her PhD at the 
University of Wollongong which considers the mandate of the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. Key themes 
which are developed in her work include: state building, post-
conflict peace-building, the intersection of social and cultural 
issues in state-based interventions. She is also the co-ordinator of 
the CAPSTRANS Lunchtime Seminars at University of 
Wollongong and teaches Development Studies at UNSW. 
  
  
